Is Latin America retreating from individual retirement accounts? by Bertranou, Fabio et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is Latin America retreating from
individual retirement accounts?
Fabio Bertranou and Esteban Calvo and Evelina Bertranou
2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17422/
MPRA Paper No. 17422, posted 26. September 2009 06:51 UTC
July 2009, Number 9-14
IS LATIN AMERICA RETREATING FROM 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS? 
* Fabio Bertranou is senior social security specialist with the International Labour Organization.  Esteban Calvo is a doctoral 
candidate in Sociology at Boston College and a graduate research assistant at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College (CRR).   Evelina Bertranou is a senior economist with the Matrix Knowledge Group.   The authors would like to 
thank Ignacio Alvarez, Barbara E. Kritzer, James Schulz, John B. Williamson, and CRR colleagues for their comments and 
other forms of help in connection to this brief.   However, the authors should be held responsible for any remaining errors 
or inaccuracies.
Introduction 
In 1981, Chile initiated old-age pension reforms 
that introduced mandatory funded individual retire-
ment accounts (IRAs) and moved away from public 
systems.   Beginning in the 1990s, ten other Latin 
American countries followed in Chile’s wake.  In 
recent years, even before the onset of the financial 
crisis, a second round of pension reforms was initi-
ated to strengthen the public component and address 
the problems created by individual accounts.  The 
most extreme case of retrenching is Argentina, where 
IRAs were eliminated for mandatory contributions in 
late 2008.  This country has gone back to a traditional 
defined-benefit pay-as-you-go scheme.  This brief 
reviews the two rounds of pension reforms to deter-
mine whether Latin American countries are moving 
away from individual pensions.1  Even though this 
region is quite heterogeneous, its labor markets and 
social security systems share some common features, 
such as a large informal economy and a variety of 
uncoordinated institutions providing old-age income 
protection.  The 2008-2009 financial crisis and eco-
nomic recession is posing new challenges to systems 
that have introduced IRAs. 
First Round of Reforms: 
Enacting IRAs
Beginning in the 1990s, the fear of large fiscal 
imbalances and mismanaged pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension schemes prompted ten Latin American 
countries to follow Chile in enacting IRAs (see Figure 
1 on the next page).2  Although the reforms improved 
long-term system sustainability, problems such as low 
coverage, a shrinking social safety net, and imperfect 
regulatory frameworks, remained.
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Many other factors – including the type of ben-
efits offered, funding mechanisms, administrative 
arrangements, and incentives – explain the varia-
tions in coverage.4  For example, the 1994 reform in 
Argentina raised retirement ages and vesting periods, 
creating stricter conditions to access benefits and thus 
reducing coverage for the population aged 65 and 
over from 78 percent in 1992 to about 65 percent in 
the mid-2000s.  In addition, unemployment, infor-
mal labor markets, and cultural factors are strong 
determinants of compliance and coverage rates.
Besides their failure to expand coverage, IRAs also 
removed some “solidarity” (or redistributive) mecha-
nisms of PAYG schemes.5  Although with important 
limitations, PAYG schemes involve not only inter-
generational redistribution (contributions from active 
workers are used to pay benefits for retirees) but also 
redistribution between income groups.  In contrast, 
IRAs are based on personal savings and leave the 
responsibility of income redistribution to social assis-
tance and minimum pensions provided by state-run 
programs.  As contributory coverage declined or re-
mained stagnant, social safety net and non-contribu-
tory programs have grown in number of beneficiaries 
in several countries, such as Chile and Colombia.
A third challenging area of IRA reforms relates 
to imperfect regulations, such as protection from 
political interference.6  Although a driving reason for 
reform was the intention to create pension systems 
highly insulated from political intervention, the 
evidence suggests that the reformed systems remain 
vulnerable to political manipulation.  For example, 
loose regulation led to ambiguous approaches to 
transition rules in Bolivia and in the early 2000s al-
lowed the government of Argentina to defer its debt 
by “selling” bonds to fund management companies 
until a default occurred.  Because of low coverage 
rates and decreased solidarity, governments continue 
financing a substantial part of the pension bill and 
public institutions continue to manage pension ben-
efits, including defined benefit, minimum guaran-
teed benefits, and social assistance pensions.  Public 
institutions also work as guarantors of the private IRA 
scheme.  In sum, although IRAs play an important 
role in reformed pension systems in Latin America, 
their enactment did not result in a full withdrawal of 
governments from pension systems.7
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Figure 1. Introduction of Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) in Latin America, Relationship 
of IRAs to Existing System
* Replaced PAYG system in 1981.  
** Re-nationalized in 2008.
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Meso-Lago (2004a); 
Gill, Packard, and Yermo (2005); and U.S. Social Security 
Administration (2003-2008) and (2008b).
IRAs were intended to create a stronger link 
between benefits and contributions to get workers to 
view their contributions as personal savings rather 
than as a tax.  This mindset would in turn encourage 
workers to contribute and would increase coverage 
and compliance rates.  However, the evidence from 
Latin America suggests that introducing IRAs did not 
improve coverage and compliance rates.3  Figure 2 on 
the next page shows that coverage rates, measured as 
the ratio of contributors to workers, actually declined 
after the reforms.  This result clearly illustrates that 
structural features of labor markets are more relevant 
than pension system design in driving coverage.
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Second Round of Reforms: 
Retrenching and Improving 
IRAs
During the last few years, Latin America started a 
second round of pension reforms in response to the 
shortcomings of IRAs.  The new political context is 
characterized by governments being less enthusiastic 
about privatization.  The reforms are resulting in a 
significant comeback of public components in old-age 
income support systems in an attempt to reach a 
better balance of social risks with individual savings.  
The case that best illustrates this trend is Chile, where 
a comprehensive pension bill was approved in 2008.8  
The 2008-2009 financial turmoil will probably rein-
force the changes of the second round of reforms in 
Latin America.  The most extreme case is Argentina, 
which “re-nationalized” IRAs, partially in response to 
the financial crisis.
Retrenchment of IRAs and Expansion of 
Public Pensions
Public institutions have maintained an important 
role even after privatization.  In the second round of 
reforms, the direct involvement of public institutions 
in pension provision has been reinforced in three 
ways: 1) allowing workers to switch back to the PAYG 
scheme; 2) incorporating solidarity and income re-
distribution mechanisms; and 3) creating new public 
pension reserve funds.
Choice between IRAs and PAYG.  The first round of 
reforms generally established that new workers were 
to join the IRAs, with no option to switch back to the 
PAYG scheme.9  Perhaps one of the more radical 
transformations of the second round of pension re-
forms has been allowing some workers to switch back 
to the PAYG scheme.  For example, in 2007 Peru per-
mitted workers enrolled in IRAs to rejoin the PAYG 
scheme if they had contributed to the PAYG scheme 
before 1996 and met conditions to retire under that 
scheme.  This law aimed to increase pensions for 
eligible workers who would have otherwise received 
a smaller pension in the IRA scheme.  In 2008, 
Uruguay also enacted regulations that allowed some 
affiliates to leave IRAs and switch back to the defined 
benefit scheme.  Argentina had taken the reforms one 
step further before the “re-nationalization” in 2008.  
During 2007, the government changed the default 
affiliation to the PAYG scheme for workers entering 
the formal labor market and – for a six-month win-
dow – allowed individuals already in the IRA scheme 
to switch back to the PAYG scheme.  Notably, of 
those eligible to switch, 80 percent stayed in the IRA 
scheme, showing that inertia is a natural outcome 
when choice is introduced in pension systems.  In 
Figure 2. Coverage Rates in Latin America Before and After First Round of Old-Age Pension Reforms
Notes: Coverage is measured as contributors/economically active population at two points in time: 1) the year before the 
reform; and 2) in 2002 for all countries except the Dominican Republic (which uses 2004 data).
Sources: Adapted from Mesa-Lago (2005); Rofman and Luccetti (2006); and AIOS (2004).
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addition, workers within 10 years of retirement and 
with low IRA balances were automatically transferred 
to the PAYG scheme.10  Furthermore, the benefit 
paid by the PAYG scheme for each year of contribu-
tion increased from 0.85 percent to 1.5 percent of 
pre-retirement wages.11  This change considerably 
raised the rate of return on contributions made to the 
public defined benefit scheme.  Later on, Argentina 
decided to re-nationalize its IRA scheme in 2008.12  
The government justified this aggressive move as a 
reaction to the financial market crisis, though reduc-
ing its budget constraints was clearly a substantial 
motivation.  The approved bill stated that, by January 
of 2009, IRA funds were to be absorbed by the public 
PAYG scheme.
Solidarity and income redistribution.  The first 
round of pension reforms partially removed impor-
tant solidarity and redistribution mechanisms.  In 
response, several countries introduced cash transfer 
programs and expanded their non-contributory pen-
sions, financed by general tax revenue, to supplement 
contributory pensions and protect old-age people 
against poverty.13  For 
example, El Salvador cre-
ated a subsidy for retirees 
receiving IRA benefits 
that are lower than they 
would have been under 
the old PAYG scheme.  In early 2008, Chile approved 
a pension reform bill aiming to provide universal and 
more equitable benefits.  The new system of “solidar-
ity pensions” gradually replaces the means-tested 
pensions and the guaranteed minimum pensions 
with two types of benefits: a non-contributory pen-
sion and a supplementary pension (top-up) benefit 
for those who have contributed to the private sys-
tem.  The supplementary monthly benefit starts at 
the level of the non-contributory solidarity pension 
and ends at about US $400.  It also provides a tax 
credit of 15 percent for voluntary savings, which is 
targeted to low-income workers.  Another interesting 
case is Colombia; in 2003 it introduced a solidarity 
pension fund, which pays non-contributory benefits 
and matches contributions for low-income work-
ers.  Although solidarity and income redistribution 
mechanisms have been enhanced elsewhere in the 
region, poverty reduction and gender equality are still 
considered missing or incomplete pieces of pension 
reform in Latin America.14 
Reserve funds for public pensions.  Latin American 
countries have also passed legislation creating sepa-
rate reserve funds to provide greater financial stability 
and reduce the burden on general revenues of fund-
ing the government’s pension obligations.15  Chile has 
instituted two separate reserve funds (the Pension 
Reserve Fund and the Economic and Social Stabiliza-
tion Fund) in response to the large budget surpluses 
attributed to the country’s record copper sales during 
recent years.  Both funds are not managed directly by 
the government, but by the Central Bank (65 percent 
of the funds) and third parties (35 percent of the 
funds).  In Argentina, a state-owned bank supervised 
by multiple-institutions manages a Sustainability 
Fund, and a committee including members from dif-
ferent agencies oversees investment decisions.
Improvement of IRAs 
Governments and private administrators have clearly 
acknowledged the shortcomings of IRAs and the need 
for intervention.  However, this recognition does not 
necessarily imply the termination of IRAs, as hap-
pened in Argentina.  The second round of pension 
reform in Latin America is also about revising IRAs 
and correcting their 
flaws.  Three examples 
of reforms aiming to 
improve IRAs are: (1) 
extending mandatory 
contributions to work-
ers not currently covered; (2) lowering costs to ac-
count holders; and (3) changing the investment rules 
for pension assets.
Extend coverage.  The first round of pension 
reforms typically made IRAs voluntary for self-em-
ployed workers.  The second round extends manda-
tory participation to these workers.16  For example, 
following Costa Rica and Colombia, Chile will start 
requiring the self-employed to gradually join the IRA 
scheme within the next seven years.  Mexico has en-
acted similar measures for the self-employed and has 
extended IRAs to federal public employees.  Other 
countries, such as Peru, are also discussing compul-
sory savings for all categories of workers.
Lower IRA costs.  High administrative fees and 
premiums for survivors and disability insurance have 
lowered net rates of return for account holders and 
produced very large profits for many fund manage-
ment and insurance companies.  The problem has 
been aggravated by participants’ lack of awareness of 
the importance of fees.17  To lower costs for account 
holders, countries have implemented a number 
of measures.18  For example, in 2008 Mexico cre-
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Recent reforms aim to correct the flaws of 
IRAs and strengthen safety nets.
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ated an indicator to help account holders compare 
the net rate of return of pension fund management 
companies.  New entrants to the labor force who do 
not choose a management company are assigned 
by default to the one with the highest rate of return.  
Transfers between companies are allowed once a year, 
but transfers to the company with the highest rate of 
return are now permitted without restrictions.  In ad-
dition, companies are now allowed to charge a fee on 
account balances, but not on monthly contributions.  
Countries such as El Salvador, Chile, and Peru took a 
similar path.  Even though these policies are expected 
to have a positive effect, it is difficult to predict their 
magnitude.  Some of the instruments to induce lower 
costs rely on past performance; therefore, their actual 
effectiveness is uncertain.  
Investment rules for pension assets.  Portfolios have 
been heavily concentrated in government bonds, but 
new types of instruments and multi-fund strategies 
have been authorized during the second round of 
reforms.  Numerous countries have implemented 
such changes, including Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Peru.19  Another way to cope with risks has been 
the implementation of multi-funds, where insured 
workers can choose among several risk-related port-
folios.  It is not clear that multi-funds actually con-
tribute to financial literacy and adequate returns for 
the average insured worker.  Furthermore, the recent 
financial market turmoil resulted in serious declines 
in IRA assets, suggesting that they were too exposed 
to market risks.  Numerous reasonable concerns have 
been raised over whether letting workers choose port-
folios with high exposure to risks are a proper “social 
security” policy. 
Conclusion
This brief addressed whether IRAs are retrenching in 
Latin America.  Although the idea is provocative, we 
conclude that the concept of “retrenchment” alone is 
insufficient to characterize the new politics and politi-
cal economy of old-age pension reform.  As opposed 
to what happened in the 1980s and 1990s, pension 
reforms in Latin America in recent years have com-
bined retrenchment with improvement of IRAs.  
During the period of enactment, ten Latin Ameri-
can countries introduced mandatory funded IRAs as 
a full or partial replacement for the old PAYG public 
schemes.  One remarkable aspect about this first 
round of pension reforms is that, even though it in-
troduced substantial changes in funding and manage-
ment, in most countries public institutions assumed 
a crucial role not only as regulating agents, but also in 
managing and financing minimum guaranteed and 
social assistance pension benefits.
The second round of pension reforms, which 
began after 2005, has reinforced the involvement of 
public institutions in the pension system.  In addi-
tion, numerous countries have introduced measures 
to improve IRAs.  The driving force of the second 
round of reforms has been to increase coverage, 
equity, and efficiency of the overall system.  With the 
exception of Argentina, which has re-nationalized its 
pension system, the second round of reforms seems 
to be less radical compared to the path-breaking 
changes introduced by the first round.
The dominant policy prescriptions in vogue dur-
ing the first round of reforms in Latin America have 
clearly been re-evaluated.  As countries started to 
engage in a second round of reforms, the World Bank 
– and other international organizations that promoted 
IRA pension reforms – has acknowledged that more 
attention should be paid to mechanisms to reduce 
poverty in old-age, to expand coverage and equity, 
and to protect participants from market risks.  Non-
contributory and universal pensions are recognized as 
playing a greater role.  The challenges faced by coun-
tries that introduced IRAs, the changes in interna-
tional financing institutions, and the recent financial 
crisis may have tempered the enthusiasm of other 
countries from applying the same type of reforms.  
Policymakers around the globe could benefit from 
looking closely at these changes in pension policy.
APPENDIX
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This appendix provides details on pension structure 
and reforms in Latin America.20
Argentina
This is the only country case of full IRA retrench-
ment.  IRAs were introduced in 1994; reformed in 
2007 to allow the choice of switching back to the 
defined benefit PAYG scheme; and, finally, eliminated 
for mandatory contributions in 2008.   The current 
system is, therefore, fully defined benefit PAYG. 
Enactment of IRAs
The reform implemented in 1994 created a mixed 
system comprising both public and private compo-
nents.  The reformed system covered both employed 
and self-employed workers with a three-tier structure: 
1) a non-earnings-related, universal public pension 
proportional to years of service; 2) an earnings-related 
public pension for contributions that preceded the 
reform; and 3) a choice between a public defined con-
tribution plan and a private IRA based on earnings af-
ter the reform.  IRAs were the default choice, with no 
option to switch back to the public system.  Separate 
schemes still operate for the following groups: armed 
forces, security forces, and the police force; civil ser-
vants of some provinces and municipalities; and other 
groups, including teachers and judicial authorities. 
     The public component was run by the state and 
financed with general revenue and contributions by 
employees and employers.  The private component 
was run by private fund managers and fully funded 
through employee contributions.  For those workers 
in the fully-funded plan, employers’ contributions 
continue financing benefits administered by the 
public component.  Apart from these contributions, 
pension benefits were funded by the government 
through general revenue and earmarked taxes for so-
cial security.  The government also contributed to the 
disability and survivor pensions of insured persons in 
transition21 who opted for the funded scheme. 
     To receive pension benefits, individuals must have 
contributed to the system for a period of at least 30 
years (increased from 20 years for women and 25 
years for men) and satisfy the age requirement (raised 
by five years, to 60 for women and 65 for men).  Indi-
viduals aged 70 and above with 10 years of contribu-
tions receive an advanced age pension. 
     The Superintendence of Retirement and Pension 
Fund Administrators were in charge of overseeing 
the pension fund administrators and the IRA scheme 
more generally.  The National Social Security Admin-
istration (ANSES) administers the PAYG scheme. 
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs 
 
In 2007 the government introduced a number of 
reforms: 
Under the new regulations, the insured were al-1) 
lowed to switch between the PAYG and the IRA 
scheme every five years.  After the reform, indi-
viduals already in the funded scheme had a six-
month period to switch back to the PAYG scheme. 
For new entrants, unless they choose an option 
within 90 days, the default was the PAYG scheme. 
Individuals close to retirement (i.e., up to 10 years 2) 
before) with low balances in their individual ac-
counts (i.e., balances that at the time they retire 
would not equal the current minimum pension 
paid by the State under the PAYG scheme) were 
automatically transferred to the PAYG scheme. 
With the aim to increase coverage, conditions to 3) 
be entitled to pension benefits were made more 
flexible.  For a defined period of time, all individu-
als at their retirement age who had not complied 
with the requirement of 30 years of contributions 
could access a reduced pension benefit. 
During Argentina’s economic downturn in late 4) 
2001, the government increased workers’ take-
home pay by lowering their pension contribution 
rates from 11 percent to 5 percent for both the 
PAYG and the IRA scheme.  By early 2002, the 
government raised contributions to 11 percent of 
earnings for workers in the public scheme and 
raised the individual account rate to 7 percent for 
those in IRAs.  In 2008, pension employees’ con-
tribution rates were equalized for both schemes at 
11 percent of earnings.
In order to provide guarantees to the PAYG 5) 
scheme, a ‘sustainability’ fund was created.  The 
fund began with US$6.45 billion in assets from 
the ANSES and is financed with any annual 
ANSES surplus.  The fund may be used only to 
pay for public pension benefits.
Prior to the 2007 reforms, pension fund man-6) 
agers were free to define their fees, always as a 
percentage of contributions (although measured 
as a percentage of salaries).  Fees were used to 
cover administrative expenses and disability and 
survivors insurance costs.  Administrative fees 
had changed over time; prior to the reform, they 
were at around 2.5 percent of wages on average (of 
which 1.1 percent was for administrative costs and 
1.4 percent for insurance).  In 2007 the govern-
ment established a maximum fee level of one 
percent of wages. 
Prior to the 2007 reforms, pension fund manag-7) 
ers were required to buy an insurance policy to 
cover the cost of an annuity (net of accumulated 
funds in the individual account) in case the worker 
died or became disabled.  Coverage was not uni-
versal, as it only included those who had contrib-
uted on a regular basis.  In 2007 the government 
eliminated the insurance scheme for disability and 
survivors benefits in the funded scheme.  It was 
replaced by a pooling mechanism including all 
pension funds.
Pension fund managers select their portfolio 8) 
structure from a wide set of possibilities.  The 
1994 Law established maximum concentration 
limits by type of instrument and issuer.  Following 
the 2007 reforms, the list of authorized invest-
ments included a new ‘type’ of instrument: “debt 
instruments, shares or other instruments that 
finance medium to long-term productive or infra-
structure projects.” Pension funds had to invest 
at least 5 percent, and up to 20 percent, of their 
assets in this new type of instrument to promote 
local economic activity.
In 2008, Argentina took the reforms one step 
further and Congress passed new legislation “re-
nationalizing” the pension system.  This meant the 
termination of IRAs for mandatory contributions and 
fully converting the system to PAYG defined benefit.  
The ANSES took over the assets held by private pen-
sion funds and the pension benefits paid by them.  
Insurance companies continued paying the annuities 
contracted before the 2008 reform. 
Bolivia
Enactment of IRAs
The structural reform that introduced IRAs in Bolivia 
was implemented in 1997.  The defined benefit PAYG 
scheme was completely closed and contributions to 
the old system switched to the new one.  While par-
ticipation of new workers in IRAs is mandatory, the 
self-employed can join the system voluntarily.  There 
is no separate system for civil servants.  
     IRA benefits are fully funded with workers’ contri-
butions.  The government contributes as an employer, 
pays a recognition bond for contributions to the old 
system and finances pensions payable under the old 
system.  Employers other than the government make 
no contribution. 
     The retirement age was increased and set at 65 for 
men and women, or at any age if the accumulated 
capital in the individual account, plus accrued inter-
est, is sufficient to finance a monthly pension equal to 
70 percent of the insured’s average covered earnings 
in the last 5 years.  For payout, only annuities are al-
lowed.  
     The system is supervised by the Superintendence 
of Pensions, Securities, and Insurance, which defines 
investment rules for pension fund administrators.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
A small universal non-contributory pension benefit 
(Bonosol) was implemented in 2002.  This benefit 
is financed from the privatization of state-owned en-
terprises and is paid to resident citizens born before 
January 1974 who reach the retirement age.  Every 
five years, the benefit amounts are recalculated by the 
Superintendence of Pensions, Securities, and Insur-
ance.  
     The Bonosol program was modified in 2008 and 
replaced by Renta Dignidad.  The program is still 
universal; however, benefits are higher for those 
who are not getting a contributory benefit.  Besides 
financing a solidarity fund to supplement pensions 
for low earners, a pension reform bill sent to Parlia-
ment in July 2008 proposes additional modifications: 
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lowering the full-retirement age to 60, creating a 
government agency to replace the two existing private 
pension fund companies, mandating employer con-
tributions, and allowing retirement at any age if IRAs 
yield a pension of 60 percent or more of the worker’s 
average salary in the previous five years.
Chile
Enactment of IRAs
In 1981, Chile was the first country to introduce an 
IRA scheme and phase out its PAYG scheme.  While 
participation in IRAs is mandatory for new salaried 
employees, affiliation for self-employed workers 
was voluntary.  There is no separate system for civil 
servants.  Only the armed and security forces have a 
separate defined benefit program. 
     Total payroll taxes were reduced substantially by 
eliminating employers’ contributions.  Employees’ 
contributions for pensions were set at 10 percent of 
wages plus about 2.4 percent for administration fees 
and insurance premiums.  Employers only make 
contributions for employees working under arduous 
conditions.  The government covers guaranteed mini-
mum pensions, social assistance pensions, and offers 
subsidies as needed to finance the program. 
     The retirement age was set at 60 for women and 
65 for men, allowing early retirement for those work-
ers with balances sufficient to finance an annuity 
higher than 50 percent of their pre-retirement wages 
or higher than 50 percent of the minimum pension.  
Payout options are annuity, scheduled withdrawal, 
and combinations of the two.  The government 
guarantees a minimum pension of 61 percent of the 
minimum wage in 1982 to workers who contributed 
for at least 20 years but who have insufficient funds 
to yield the minimum pension, and to retirees who 
have chosen scheduled withdrawal but lived beyond 
their expected retirement age and exhausted their 
funds.  The value of the minimum pension has been 
adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index. 
     The IRA scheme has been supervised by the 
Superintendence of Pension Fund Management 
Companies (SAFP), which was reformulated as the 
Superintendence of Pensions (SUPEN) under the 
2008 reform.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
In 2002, a multi-fund format was adopted.  Men 
under 55 and women under 50 can choose between 
five types of funds offering varying degrees of risk (A, 
B, C, D and E), whereas men and women older than 
these ages can only choose between the four funds 
of relatively minor risk, and pensioners between the 
three funds of lesser relative risk.  The balances from 
mandatory contributions can be distributed between 
two different funds within one pension fund manage-
ment company.  Investment rules have been modified 
to allow more foreign assets in pension fund portfo-
lios.  For payouts, a combination of options (annuity 
and scheduled withdrawal) is also allowed. 
     In 2007, rules for early retirement were changed, 
making them stricter to discourage early withdrawal 
from the labor force with relatively low benefits.  The 
new rules establish that the accumulated funds must 
be sufficient to finance an annuity higher than 58 
percent of their pre-retirement wages or higher than 
150 percent of the minimum pension.  
     In 2008, Chile introduced significant changes to 
the pension system as a whole.  The minimum pen-
sion guarantee program was merged with the social 
assistance benefit program, creating a public institu-
tion that manages two types of benefits: a minimum 
non-contributory benefit that is paid to the poorest 
60 percent of the elderly and a supplementary benefit 
for those workers with low IRA balances.  Payroll 
contributions were not increased; however, the pay-
ment of the insurance premium for disability and 
survivorship will switch from employees to employers 
in July 2009.  This insurance coverage now reaches 
male widowers.  The self-employed will be gradually 
required to join the IRA scheme.  Voluntary occu-
pational schemes have been also introduced on top 
of mandated IRAs and individual voluntary pension 
savings.  In sum, the pension system has gained in 
coverage, benefits generosity, and coordination. 
Colombia
Enactment of IRAs
The structural reform started in 1994 after Congress 
passed a comprehensive bill reforming both the pen-
sion and health systems.  IRAs were introduced to 
the pension systems.  Workers can either choose to 
remain in a reformed defined benefit PAYG scheme 
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or move to the privately-managed system.  Participa-
tion in IRAs is voluntary for new workers and they 
are allowed to switch between both systems.  Separate 
systems for civil servants and other groups of workers 
still remain. 
     Total contributions to pensions in the fully funded 
scheme are 15.5 percent of wages, which includes 
10 percent for the IRA, 4 percent for administration 
fees and insurance premiums, and 1.5 percent for the 
Minimum Pension Guarantee Fund.  High-income 
workers have an additional wage contribution, which 
finances a Solidarity Pension Fund.  Resources of 
the Solidarity Pension Fund are used to pay social 
assistance benefits and to finance a subsidy that 
matches contributions of low-income workers in the 
contributory defined benefit scheme.  The 15.5 percent 
contribution is shared by employers (11.63 percent) 
and workers (3.88 percent). 
     The retirement age was harmonized and increased 
to 57 for women and 62 for men.  In the IRA scheme, 
there is no minimum retirement age but a minimum 
account balance is required.  Payout options are annu-
ity or scheduled withdrawal.  
     The IRA scheme is supervised by the Superinten-
dence of Banks and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security.  COLPENSIONES (formerly the Social Secu-
rity Institute) administers the public program nation-
ally and supervises regional funds and local offices.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
A Solidarity Pension Fund and a Minimum Pension 
Guarantee Fund were added to the system.  The Soli-
darity Pension Fund pays non-contributory benefits 
and matches contributions for low-income formal 
workers.  In addition, numerous legal modifications 
have introduced additional schemes and funding to 
improve fairness and solidarity of the system.  For 
example, Colombia abolished privileged pensions and 
will start increasing the retirement age and requir-
ing self-employed workers to gradually join the IRA 
system.  Also, in 2008, a bill was sent to Congress 
proposing that the IRA scheme introduce a “multi-
funds” format allowing affiliates to choose among 
three different investment portfolios.  The bill also 
requires that each fund management company yield 
a minimum rate of return for each type of pension 
fund, in addition to a minimum rate of return based 
on the average annual rate of return for all the fund 
management companies in the system.
Costa Rica
Enactment of IRAs
In 2001, Costa Rica introduced IRAs as a supplement 
to the PAYG pension scheme.  The result is a mixed 
pension system.  Public and private sector employees 
as well as the self-employed are covered under the 
PAYG, but IRAs are mandatory just for public and 
private sector employees.  Special systems for teach-
ers and employees of the Justice Department remain.  
     Contributions to IRAs are 1 percent of earnings for 
employees and 1.75 percent of payroll for employers.  
The PAYG scheme is funded with worker, employer 
and government contributions.  Workers contribute 
2.5 percent of their gross earnings and employers 
contribute 4.75 percent of payroll.  Self-employed 
workers contribute between 4.75 percent and 7.25 
percent of their gross declared earnings.  In addition, 
the government contributes 0.25 percent of the gross 
income of all workers.  
     The retirement ages are 61 and 11 months for 
men and 59 and 11 months for women.  Additionally, 
under the PAYG scheme, beneficiaries are required to 
have contributed for 240 months.  Individuals aged 
65 with at least 15 years of contributions are entitled 
to a reduced pension benefit. 
     IRAs are administered by Pension Operators, who 
are regulated and supervised by the Superintendence 
of Pensions.  Also the National Council for the Su-
pervision of the Financial System provides regulatory 
oversight.  The PAYG scheme is administered by the 
Social Insurance Fund, which is directed by an execu-
tive president and a nine-member board. 
Retrenchment and  
Improvement of IRAs
With the aim to guarantee the long-term solvency of 
the system, major changes to the PAYG scheme were 
implemented in 2006.  Workers over age 55 were 
not affected, and transition rules apply to workers 
between the ages of 45 and 55.  For workers under age 
45, the following changes were introduced:
The combined contribution rate from employees, 1) 
employers, and the government will be gradually 
raised over a 30-year period from 7.5 percent of 
earnings to 10.5 percent.
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The new basis for calculating the benefit is given 2) 
by the average earnings over the last 20 years, 
adjusted for inflation, replacing the previous 
method of the highest 48 monthly contributions 
during the last five years of coverage.
The minimum number of required monthly con-3) 
tributions was raised from 240 to 300.
A separate disability benefit – 50 percent of the 4) 
full disability benefit – was set up for workers 
aged 48 and older with at least five years of con-
tributions.  For all other workers, the 10 years of 
contributions requirement has persisted.
Dominican Republic
Enactment of IRAs
The reform implemented in 2003 replaced the old 
PAYG scheme with mandatory IRAs for all public 
and private sector workers, employers, and Domini-
can citizens living abroad, but not the self-employed.  
During the transition, coverage was mandatory for 
private sector workers younger than age 45 in 2003, 
but voluntary for workers aged 45 or older and cur-
rent public sector employees.  The reformed system 
also includes a social assistance pension for severely 
disabled, indigent, unemployed, or self-employed 
people with income below the minimum wage.   
     IRAs are fully funded by mandatory contributions 
of the insured person and the employer.  The insured 
person contributes 4.4 percent of covered earnings up 
to 20 times the minimum wage, with 2.87 percent of 
covered earnings going directly to the IRA, 1 percent 
going to disability and survivor insurance, 0.5 percent 
to administrative fees of fund management compa-
nies and 0.07 percent to cover operating costs of the 
supervisory institution.  The government guarantees 
a minimum pension and finances the total cost of the 
social assistance pension.   
     IRA benefits can be claimed at age 60 with 30 
years of contributions or more, or as early as age 55 
if the IRA balance is at least equal to the minimum 
pension.  Early benefits are also available at age 57 
for unemployed workers with at least 300 months 
of contributions, or reduced benefits if less than 300 
months.  Gainful activity can continue after claiming 
benefits and benefits are not payable abroad.  The so-
cial assistance pension is income-tested and payable 
at age 60 to indigents.   
     The National Social Security Board provides overall 
governance of the pension system and the Superin-
tendence of Pensions provides general supervision.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
There is a plan to implement a system of subsidized 
mandatory individual accounts for the self-employed.  
El Salvador
Enactment of IRAs
The reform was implemented in 1998, when the 
country replaced the old pension system and fully 
privatized it.  All new employees and all younger em-
ployees (those who were under age 36 in 1998) were 
required to enroll in the funded scheme.  The old sys-
tem remained in place for older employees (insured 
men older than 55 or women older than 50) but it has 
been gradually phased out.  Participation in the new 
system was voluntary for those between the ages of 36 
and 55 (men) or 50 (women) at the time of the reform. 
Participation is also voluntary for the self-employed 
and owners of small enterprises.   
     Under the funded scheme, contribution rates were 
initially set at 4.5 percent – approximately two-thirds 
payable by employers and one-third by workers.  In 
addition, workers had to pay an insurance premium 
to cover the risks of disability and survivorship as 
well as an administration fee charged by the private 
fund managers.  For those remaining in the old 
system, and seeking to provide an incentive for affili-
ates to switch over to the new system, contribution 
rates were set at 8 percent.  Currently, in the funded 
scheme, total contribution rates are very similar 
for both employers and workers – 6.75 percent and 
6.25 percent, respectively.  In the PAYG scheme, the 
contribution rates are 7 percent for both employers 
and workers.  Voluntary contribution for the self-em-
ployed is 13 percent of declared covered earnings, plus 
up to a maximum of 3 percent of declared covered 
earnings for disability and survivor insurance and 
administrative fees. 
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     Entitlement to pension benefits requires 25 years 
of contributions.  The age requirements are 60 
for men and 55 for women.  However, under both 
systems, workers with 30 years of contributions are 
allowed to retire regardless of their age.  The gov-
ernment guarantees a minimum pension for those 
insured under the new system.  In addition to the pre-
vious requirements, access to the guaranteed mini-
mum pension – subsidized by the government – is 
restricted to those insured individuals whose pension 
(based on the value of the accumulated capital plus 
accrued interest) is less than the minimum pension 
set by law and who have no other income.   
     IRAs are operated by Pension Fund Management 
companies, which are supervised by the Superinten-
dent of Pensions.  The PAYG scheme is administered 
by the Social Insurance Institute, which is supervised 
by a board of 12 directors including the Minister of 
Labor, representatives of other ministries, the Direc-
tor of Social Insurance, and representatives of man-
agement, labor and other professional groups.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
Beginning in late 2003, pensioners who retire under 
the new system and whose retirement benefit is less 
than what they would have received if they had re-
mained in the old PAYG scheme receive an additional 
benefit subsidized by the government.  In addition, a 
number of reforms have been introduced in the past 
few years in order to improve the IRA system: 
In order to encourage later retirement and boost 1) 
IRA balances, the government established that, 
regardless of having 30 years of contribution, the 
minimum retirement ages are 60 years for men 
and 55 for women.
Beginning in mid-2006, fund managers were 2) 
required to lower their administrative fees to 
allow workers to save more for retirement.  The 
maximum combined fee that they can charge for 
administration and for survivors and disability 
insurance was decreased from 3 percent to 2.7 
percent of earnings and the cost was shifted from 
the worker to the employer.
In order to reduce the costs linked to frequent 3) 
transfers between the two private fund manag-
ers existing in the country, workers will have to 
remain with one private fund manager at least 
one year instead of only six months. 
Mexico
Enactment of IRAs
In 1997 Mexico implemented IRAs meant to replace 
the PAYG scheme in the long term.  The PAYG 
scheme continued to cover some employees in ag-
ricultural and credit union cooperatives that joined 
before 1997.  IRAs are mandatory for all private sector 
employees and cooperative members entering the 
labor force after 1997.  Participation is voluntary for 
public sector employees not covered by other systems. 
Special systems for oil workers, public sector employ-
ees, and military personnel still exist. 
     IRAs are funded by employers, employees, and the 
government.  Employees contribute 1.125 percent of 
covered earnings, plus an average of 0.625 percent 
for disability and survivor benefits, and an additional 
amount for administrative fees.  Employers contrib-
ute 5.15 percent of covered payroll, plus an average 
of 1.75 percent for disability and survivor benefits.  
Self-employed workers contribute 6.275 percent of 
declared earnings, 2.375 percent for disability and 
survivor benefits, and an additional amount for 
administrative fees.  The government contributes 
0.225 percent of salary for workers under the PAYG 
scheme, plus 0.125 percent of covered earnings for 
disability and survivor benefits.  The government also 
finances the guaranteed minimum pension and pro-
vides a subsidy for each day of an entire working life 
that workers contribute to individual accounts.  This 
subsidy is deposited into workers’ IRA accounts every 
2 months. 
     Under the funded scheme, the retirement age is 65 
years for both men and women, and individuals must 
have contributed for at least 1,250 weeks.  Those with 
less than 1,250 weekly contributions may continue to 
contribute or receive a lump-sum benefit.  The same 
age and years of contributions are required for access-
ing the minimum pension, which is guaranteed to 
those individuals whose pension benefit (based on the 
value of the accumulated capital plus accrued inter-
est) is less than the minimum pension.  Early retire-
ment is possible at any age for those whose individual 
account balance is sufficient to purchase an annuity 
that is at least 30 percent greater than the value of 
the minimum guaranteed pension.  Also, individuals 
aged 60 to 64 with at least 1,250 weekly contributions 
who are unable to find suitable paid employment 
may access an unemployed worker’s pension ben-
efit.  Individuals covered by the PAYG scheme must 
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contribute for at least 500 weeks and are allowed to 
retire at the age of 65.  Individuals aged 60 to 64 with 
at least 500 weeks of contributions who are unable to 
find suitable paid employment may access their funds 
as an unemployed worker’s pension benefit. 
     IRAs are operated by pension fund management 
companies, which are supervised by the National 
Commission for the Retirement Savings System 
(CONSAR).  The PAYG scheme is administered by 
the Social Security Institute though regional and local 
boards. 
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
Since 1997, a large number of reforms to improve 
and strengthen the IRA scheme have been imple-
mented in Mexico:
In 2005, to expand pension coverage, the self-1) 
employed were allowed to set up an IRA.  Also, 
two new pension fund management companies 
were authorized.  Millions of low-income workers 
not covered by social security were able to set up 
an IRA with one of these companies.  
Beginning in 2008, all new public sector em-2) 
ployees are required to join the funded scheme.  
Those already working in the public sector under 
age 46 had the option to join a new pension 
fund manager – called PENSIONISSSTE – or 
to remain in the PAYG scheme and receive a 
recognition bond for the value of their accrued 
rights under the PAYG scheme.  For the first 
three years, PENSIONISSSTE will manage the 
public employee’s IRAs.  In the fourth year, pub-
lic employees will be allowed to switch to any of 
the pension fund management companies, and 
PENSIONISSSTE will continue to manage IRAs 
for public employees who do not chose another 
pension fund manager.  Beginning in the fifth 
year of operation, public employees will be able to 
switch to another pension fund manager or back 
to PENSIONISSSTE once a year.  PENSION-
ISSSTE is directed by an 18-member executive 
commission of representatives from worker 
organizations and government agencies, as well 
as the Institute of Social Security and Health for 
public sector employees.  The CONSAR, which 
is the regulatory and supervisory agency for the 
IRA scheme for private sector workers, will also 
oversee PENSIONISSSTE.  The administrative 
fees that PENSIONISSSTE charges account hold-
ers may not be higher than the average fees for all 
the pension fund management companies.
To stimulate competition among private fund 3) 
managers, in 2005 workers were allowed to 
switch to a company charging lower administra-
tive fees at any time, rather than just once a year.
Starting in 2008, pension fund managers are no 4) 
longer allowed to charge account holders a fee 
on their monthly contributions; they can only 
charge a fee on the IRA balances.  Also, in order 
to increase competition, it was established that 
the regulator calculates a net rate of return indica-
tor to allow account holders to compare the net 
rates of return of different pension fund manag-
ers for the previous 36 months.  New entrants to 
the labor force who do not choose a pension fund 
manager are automatically assigned to the one 
with the highest net rate of return at that time.  
Pension funds were initially limited to investing 5) 
in government instruments, but in 2004 pen-
sion fund management companies were allowed 
to invest 15 percent of assets in various approved 
equity indices and 20 percent in foreign debt.  
Further, in 2007, the limit on equity investments 
was raised from 15 percent to 30 percent.  
Before 2004, each pension fund management 6) 
company was limited to offering one fund for 
mandatory contributions and another for addi-
tional voluntary contributions.  Since late 2004, 
each company can offer two types of pension 
funds.  Workers under age 56 can choose be-
tween a fund that invests mainly in fixed-income 
securities and one that invests up to 15 percent 
of assets in approved equity indexes.  Further 
reforms implemented in 2007 established that 
each pension fund manager may offer five differ-
ent funds with varying levels of risk designated 
for specific age groups.  The new funds range 
from the highest risk level available, Fund 1 
(for workers aged 18–26) with up to 30 percent 
invested in equities, to the least risky Fund 5 (for 
workers aged 56–65) with portfolios containing 
fixed income.  Younger workers who are not com-
fortable with the level of risk in the fund desig-
nated for their age group are permitted to change 
to a fund designated for an older age group.
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Panama
Enactment of IRAs
Panama introduced IRAs as a supplement to the 
PAYG scheme in January, 2008.  Under this mixed 
pension system, IRAs are mandatory for new en-
trants to the labor force and all self-employed workers 
younger than age 36.  Other workers have the option 
to switch to the new system or remain under the pub-
lic PAYG scheme.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
The system was implemented recently and there are 
no important changes to date. 
Peru
Enactment of IRAs
Peru introduced IRAs in 1993 in parallel to the PAYG 
scheme.  Workers are allowed to opt for either system. 
Those who do not make a choice become members 
of the funded scheme automatically.  Those who 
opt for the PAYG scheme may switch to the funded 
scheme but have no option to switch back.  The PAYG 
scheme covers wage earners and salaried employ-
ees in the private and public sectors, employees of 
worker-owned and cooperative enterprises, teachers, 
self-employed drivers, artists, domestic workers, sea-
men, journalists, tannery workers, and self-employed 
agricultural workers.  Special systems operate for 
fishermen, military and police personnel.  Coverage is 
voluntary for certain self-employed persons, for those 
who are economically active but no longer in covered 
employment (a minimum of 18 months previous 
coverage is required), and housewives.  The funded 
scheme provides coverage to private and public sector 
employees. 
     Contributions to the PAYG scheme are approxi-
mately 13 percent of gross earnings for both employ-
ees and self-employed workers.  Under the funded 
scheme, both employees and self-employed workers 
contribute 10 percent of gross earnings, plus an aver-
age 0.91 percent of covered earnings for disability and 
survivor insurance and an average of 1.81 percent of 
gross earnings for administrative fees.  Between 1995 
and 2006, the contribution rate under the funded 
scheme was “temporarily” reduced to 8 percent in or-
der to encourage participation.  Whether in the PAYG 
or the funded scheme, employers do not contribute to 
the system and the government finances the mini-
mum pension. 
     Conditions for retiring under the PAYG scheme 
are 60 years of age and at least 20 years of contribu-
tions for both men and women.  Early retirement is 
allowed under the following conditions: 55 years of 
age and at least 30 years of contributions for men or 
50 years of age and at least 25 years of contributions 
for women; or 55 years of age and at least 20 years of 
contributions for both men and women in the event 
of a collective lay-off from employment.  Under the 
funded scheme, the retirement age is 65 but individu-
als are allowed to retire at any age if the individual ac-
count has accumulated assets that will replace at least 
50 percent of average indexed earnings in the last 120 
months.  To receive a guaranteed minimum pension, 
individuals must: be born before 1946, be at least 65 
years old, have made at least 20 years of contributions 
paid on earnings equal to or more than the minimum 
wage, and be entitled to a pension payable (based 
on the value of the accumulated capital plus accrued 
interest) that is less than the minimum pension. 
     The PAYG scheme is administered by the Office 
of Social Security Normalization.  Contributions are 
collected by the National Superintendence of Tax 
Administration and the Comptroller General of the 
Republic provides general supervision.  Pension fund 
administrators manage the individual accounts and 
the Superintendence of Banks, Insurance, and Pen-
sion Fund Administrators licenses and supervises 
pension fund and insurance companies.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
With the purpose of providing a higher pension to 
those workers who would have received a much lower 
pension if they remained in the funded scheme, be-
ginning in 2007 certain workers enrolled in privately-
managed individual retirement accounts may perma-
nently switch back to the PAYG scheme.  Workers 
permitted to leave the funded scheme must have been 
a contributor to the public system before 1996 and 
must have been eligible to retire under the public 
system at that time or when they joined the individual 
account system.  
     Starting in 2003, several other reforms have been 
implemented with the aim of improving the IRA 
scheme:
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Since late 2003, pension fund managers must 1) 
use a competitive bidding process to select an 
insurance company to provide the survivors and 
disability insurance rather than the “no-bid pro-
cess” they used in the past.  
In 2006, the contribution rate automatically 2) 
rose to 10 percent of earnings because Congress 
did not vote to keep it at the reduced level of 8 
percent.  
Until late 2005, each pension management com-3) 
pany could offer only a single fund with limited 
investments.  Beginning in 2006, workers with 
individual accounts are permitted to choose a 
fund from among three different types with 
varying degrees of risk: Type 1 is a preservation 
of capital fund with up to 10 percent in equities 
and up to 100 percent in fixed income; Type 2 is 
a mixed or balanced fund with up to 45 percent 
in equities (the original fund when only one was 
permitted); and Type 3 is a growth fund, with up 
to 80 percent in equities and up to 70 percent in 
fixed income.  Workers who do not make a choice 
are assigned to Type 2.  Account holders over the 
age of 60 are automatically assigned to a Type 1 
fund to reduce their portfolio risk.
In 2005, the rules for transferring from one 4) 
pension fund manager to another were eased.  
Previously, a worker opting to switch funds had 
to make at least six monthly contributions to one 
fund, pay an exit fee, and wait 10 months for the 
process to be completed.  Under the new law, 
the worker needs only be enrolled with a pen-
sion fund manager, the fee is eliminated, and 
the process should take 2 to 3 months.  Also, an 
account holder must choose one type of fund for 
the mandatory contribution and may set up a sec-
ond account with another company for additional 
voluntary contributions.
By late 2006, Peru’s Central Reserve Bank 5) 
increased the limit on how much pension fund 
management companies can invest abroad.  
The limit was increased from 10.2 percent to 12 
percent of assets under management and future 
incremental increases may be gradually autho-
rized, until the limit reaches the legal maximum 
of 20 percent.
Uruguay
Enactment of IRAs
Uruguay introduced IRAs in 1996.  The PAYG 
scheme remains open and plays a significant role 
because only high income workers were mandated to 
contribute to IRAs.  Workers below a threshold level 
can choose to split contributions between the PAYG 
scheme and IRAs.  The mixed system is mandatory 
for both employed and self-employed people born 
after April 1, 1956.  However, contributions to IRAs 
are voluntary for workers with monthly income below 
a minimum set by law.  Civil servants are included in 
the general system. 
     The total payroll tax rate was kept at the pre-reform 
level (27.5 percent for pensions).  For those work-
ers opting for IRAs, the employee contribution was 
established at 15 percent of wages.  Administration 
fees and insurance premiums are deducted from the 
15 percent; in 2006, these charges reached about 2.7 
percent of wages.  Employers also contribute 12.5 
percent of wages for pensions, but these resources 
are directed to the public system.  The government 
pays the total cost of non-contributory pensions and 
finances deficits with earmarked taxes.  For payout, 
only annuities are allowed. 
     For both the public and private components, the 
retirement age was increased to 60 for men and 
women, and the minimum period of contributions to 
be entitled was set at 35 years.  At age 65, IRA benefits 
can be received with no minimum required years of 
contribution. 
     The Social Insurance Institute administers the 
social insurance program and collaborates with the 
supervision of IRAs.  A specialized unit in the Central 
Bank oversees pension fund management and insur-
ance companies.
Retrenchment and Improvement of IRAs
Few changes have been introduced in the pension 
system since the reform.  In 2008, a decree gave 
some workers the right to withdraw from the IRA 
system and become entitled to the benefit paid by 
the PAYG scheme.  This decree applies only to those 
workers who were 40 years or older at the time of the 
reform.   
     Also in 2008, pension fund management compa-
nies were allowed to invest 15 percent of their assets 
in foreign instruments.  Before this reform, almost 
60 percent was invested in government debt.
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Endnotes
1  Brazil is not included in this discussion because it 
reformed its pension system without moving towards 
IRAs. Brazil, however, has a long history with occupa-
tional plans managed by private companies and, more 
recently, legislation has allowed sub-national state 
governments to create supplementary occupational 
pension plans. 
2  The case of Panama is only discussed in the appen-
dix, as IRAs were only enacted recently and no major 
revisions have been introduced to the system.
3  Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) (2006); Rofman and Lucchetti 
(2006); and Mesa-Lago (2008).
4  Bertranou (2004); Calvo and Williamson (2008); 
and Federación Internacional de Administradoras de 
Fondos de Pensiones (2006).
5  Mesa-Lago (2004b, 2008).
6  Bertranou, Rofman, and Grushka (2003); Calvo 
and Williamson (2008); and Gill, Packard, and Yermo 
(2005). Although PAYG may also suffer from weak 
regulations, IRAs were oversold in their capacity to 
prevent political manipulation.
7  Barr (2002); Kay and Sinha (2008); Schulz (2009); 
and Williamson (2001).  As pointed out by Béland 
and Gran (2008), the line between private and public 
can be “fuzzy” when states regulate, promote, finance, 
and mandate private pension provision.
8  Barr and Diamond (2008); Kritzer (2008); and Vial 
and Melguizo (2008).
9  U.S. Social Security Administration (2007-09, 
2007-04, 2005-02, 2004-04).
10  Insured individuals with low balances were de-
fined as those that, at the normal age of retirement, 
would not be able to buy an annuity equivalent to 
the minimum pension paid by the defined benefit 
scheme.
11  This change means that for a worker retiring with 
30 years of contributions, the replacement rate would 
increase from 25.5 percent (30*0.85) to 45 percent 
(30*1.5).  Note that this benefit is paid on top of the 
basic pension.
12  Cottani (2008); The Economist (2008); Poder 
Ejecutivo Nacional (2008); and The Wall Street Journal 
(2008).
13  Consejo Asesor Presidencial Para la Reforma Pre-
visional (2006); and U.S. Social Security Administra-
tion (2008-02, 2007-01, 2006-07, 2003-12).
14  Barrientos (2006).
15  U.S. Social Security Administration (2007-09, 
2006-09).
16  Consejo Asesor Presidencial Para la Reforma 
Previsional (2006); and U.S. Social Security Admin-
istration (2008-02, 2007-01, 2006-08, 2006-07, 
2005-05).
17  James, Packard, and Holzmann (2008).
18  U.S. Social Security Administration (2008-04, 
2008-02, 2007-11, 2007-06, 2007-04, 2006-11, 
2006-09, 2006-08, 2006-03, 2005-12, 2005-09, 
2005-05, 2003-12).
19  U.S. Social Security Administration (2008-04, 
2007-08, 2006-12, 2006-08, 2006-01, 2005-03, 
2004-06, 2003-12, 2003-10).
20  Unless otherwise specified, the information pre-
sented in this appendix was drawn from U.S. Social 
Security Administration (2003-2008) and (2008b); 
and Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Su-
pervisión de Fondos de Pensiones (2007).
21  Workers in transition were those who contributed 
to the pre-reform system and remain in the labor 
market under the new system.
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